Analysis of ranking of dairy bargaining cooperative objectives by Ladd, George W.
Volume 35
Number 550 Analysis of ranking of dairy bargaining
cooperative objectives
Article 1
January 1967
Analysis of ranking of dairy bargaining cooperative
objectives
George W. Ladd
Iowa State University of Science & Technology
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/researchbulletin
Part of the Agriculture Commons, and the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station Publications at Iowa State
University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Bulletin (Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station) by
an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ladd, George W. (1967) "Analysis of ranking of dairy bargaining cooperative objectives," Research Bulletin (Iowa Agriculture and Home
Economics Experiment Station): Vol. 35 : No. 550 , Article 1.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/researchbulletin/vol35/iss550/1
Analysis of Ranking 
of 
Dairy Bargaining Cooperative Objectives 
by George W. Ladd 
Department of Economics 
AGRICULTURE AND HOME ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT STATION 
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY of Science and Technology 
Research Bulletin 550 ••• January 1967 ••• Ames, Iowa 

CONTENTS 
Summary ....................... _ ....... _ ..... __ .......... _ ... _ .... _ ...... _ .................... __ .......... _ ........ 880 
In trod u ction ............. _ .................. _ ....... __ ................. _ .............. " ._ .................... ____ 881 
Purpose of study .............................. _ ... _ ....................... _ .. __ ............................... 881 
Institutional framework .......................................................................... _ ....... 881 
Cooperative study ......................................... __ ....... _ .......................... _ .............. 882 
Coopera ti ve ob j ecti ves .................. _ .................... ___ ... _____ ........ ___ . ________ ...... __ ...... 882 
Regression analysis of rankings ________________ .............. ____ .... _ ... __________ ._ ... __ ......... 883 
Single-equation models . __ . _______________ ._ .... __ ............. _ .. _____ . _________ .......... ____ .... 883 
Multiple-equation model _._. ________ . __ . _______ .......... _. ___ . ________ .. _ ... __ ... _ ............... 886 
Discriminant analysis _ ........... ___ . ________ .... ____ ..................................... __ ._ .... _ ........ 887 
Single-equation models . __ .. _ ....... _ .. _ ....... ________________________ . __ . _____ . __ .... ________ . ___ 887 
Multiple-equation model . ___ ................. _ .. ___ ._ ... _____________ .... ________ ... ______ . ____ . __ 888 
Economic interpretation of regression 
and discriminant results ________ .. _. ____ .. _ .. _._._ ........................................................ 889 
Obj ective 1 (negotiating high price) .............................................. _ ....... 890 
Xs (= distance from Eau Claire) .................................................. 890 
Xs (= average class I price) ..................... _ .............. _ ................... _.890 
Xl3 (= size of cooperative's processing plant) ...................... _ ..... 890 
Objective 2 (= maintaining market for members' milk). __ ..... 890 
Objective 6 (= negotiating for value of services 
provided handlers) .......................................................................... 890 
o bj ecti ve 2 _ .......... _ ....... _ .... _. __ ........................................ _ ........................... 8 90 
X2 (= average volume per handler) _ ................................... __ ...... 890 
X9 (= percentage of milk used in class I products) .................. 891 
Objective 3 (maintain class I sales) ................................ _ ..................... 891 
X4 (= dummy variable) ............ __ .............. __ ._ .................. _._ ........ _ .. 891 
X9 ____ . __ ._ ... _. __ . __ ._ .. ___ ........ _. __ ................ _ ........... _ ....... _ ... _ ... _ ................... 891 
XIS (= number of dairy cows per crop acre) ................... _ .......... 891 
Objective 4 (control all milk in area) _. __ ... __ .. _ ...... ___ ............. _ ................. 891 
X 2 .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 891 
X7 (= percentage of cooperative's volume replaceable 
by alternative sources) .................................................................... 892 
X D •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 892 
Other obj ectives .......................................... _ ................................... 892 
Objective 5 (increasing procurement area) .......................................... 892 
Xe ............• __ ..... _ ... ____ .... _____ ._ .. __ .. _____ ... __ .. _._. ___ ............• _._ ........ _ ............. 892 
Xs --.... _ .................... _ ....... _ ... _ .... _ ... _ .......................... _ ..................... _._.892 
Objective 4 .... _ ...... _ .. _ .... _ .... _._ ....... _ ................. _._._ ................................ 892 
Objective 6 (negotiating value of services provided 
bottlers) .. _ ... _ ............................... _ .. _ .. _ ................................. _ ..................... 892 
Xl (= percentage of bottlers who bargained) .......... _ .. _ .............. 892 
Obj ectives 1 and 4 .. _ .................................. __ ._._ .......... __ ... __ ._ ............. _893 
Objective 7 (maintaining good relations with handlers) ....... _ ....... __ ... 893 
X 7 ._ •••• _ •••••• __ ••••• _. __ ••• __ • __ •• ____ ••• _ ••••• _. ___ •• ___ ••••••• ___ • __ •••• __ •••••••••••• _. _____ • __ ._._893 
X10 (= negotiated premium on class I milk) ................................ 893 
Xu (= number of bottlers who would bargain) ........................ 893 
X 13 •••••••••• __ ._ •• ___ ._ •••• _ ••• _ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ ••••••••••••••••• 893 
Obj ective 1 ........................................................................................ 893 
Errors of classification ._ ......... _ .............. _ .. _ ..... _._ .. _. __ ................................ 893 
Principal components ................................................................ _ .. __ ................. 893 
Suggestions for further work ... _ ............................................... _ .................... 895 
References ........................................................................................................ 896 
879 
SUMMARY 
The objective of this study was to develop 
hypotheses concerning the determinants of the 
relative importance of various objectives to grade 
A milk producers' bargaining cooperatives. 
A list of possible objectives of the cooperatives 
was developed from discussions with cooperative 
managers and people who have worked with these 
managel·S. Managers of nine cooperatives then 
ranked these objectives. Each ranked the objec-
tives in order of importance to his own coopera-
tive. Variations in the ranks assigned the objec-
tives were analyzed in a search for statistically 
significant relations between characteristics of 
cooperatives and their markets and rankings of 
objectives. Regression analysis and discriminant 
analysis were used. After statistically significant 
results were obtained, their logical plausibility was 
examined. 
Usually in econometric research we have plior 
hypotheses available at the beginning of a study. 
A statistically significant result confirms or re-
jects a prior hypothesis. At the beginning of this 
study there were no prior hypotheses available on 
determinants of relative importance of valious 
objectives. The data were analyzed in a search for 
statistically significant results. A summary of 
these significant results follows. These results are 
hypotheses that can be tested in future research; 
they are not statistical confirmation of prior hy· 
potheses. 
The number following each objective shows the 
pooled (01' average) rank assigned that objective. 
Following each objective is a list of variables af-
fecting the rank assigned that objective. A "pos." 
in parentheses following a variable means that 
the variable was positively related to the im-
portance of the objective in this study; the ob-
jective tends to be more important for coopera-
tives with a high value of this variable than for 
cooperatives with a low value of this variable. A 
"neg." in parentheses means that the variable 
was negatively related to the importance of the 
objective. 
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I. Objective 1, negotiating a high price-2 
A. Cooperative's distance from Eau Claire, 
Wisconsin (pos.) Eau Claire is the 
center of a region of surplus grade A 
milk production. The availability of this 
milk to bottlers near Eau Claire may 
affect the ability of cooperatives serv-
ing these bottlers to negotiate for high 
prices. 
B. Bottler's buying price for class I milk 
purchased from cooperative (pos.) 
C. Percentage of cooperative's milk that 
could be handled in its own processing 
plant (pos.) 
D. Rank assigned objective 2 (neg.) 
E. Rank assigned objective 6 (pos.) 
II. Objective 2, maintaining a market for 
members' milk-1 
A. Average volume of bottlers supplied by 
cooperative (neg.) 
B. Percentage of cooperative's milk sold 
to class I outlets (pos.) 
III. Objective 3, maintaining past highest per· 
centage of class I sales-3 
A. Percentage of cooperative's volume sold 
to class I outlets (pos.) 
B. Number of dairy cows per crop acre 
(neg.) 
IV. Objective 4, controlling all milk produced in 
cooperative's procurement area-5 
A. Average volume of bottlers supplied by 
cooperative (pos.) 
B. Percentage of cooperative's milk re-
placeable from alternative sources 
(neg.) 
C. Percentage of cooperative's volume sold 
to class I outlets (neg.) 
D. Rank assigned objective 5 (pos.) 
V. Objective 5, increasing size of procurement 
area-7 
A. Bottler's buying price for class I milk 
(neg.) 
VI. Objective 6, negotiating for value of serv· 
ices provided handlers-6 
A. Percentage of bottlers who bargained 
with cooperative (neg.) 
B. Rank of objective 1 (pos.) 
VII. Objective 7, maintaining good relations 
with handlers-4 
A. Percentage of cooperative's milk re-
placeable from alternative sources 
(pos.) 
B. Negotiated premium on class I milk 
(neg.) 
C. Number of bottlers who bargained with 
cooperative (neg.) 
D. Percentage of cooperative's milk that 
could be handled in its own processing 
plant (neg.) 
E. Rank assigned objective 1 (pos.) 
It was possible to find reasonable explanations 
for most of the relationships found in the statis-
tical analyses. 
The use of principal components also was 
studied. 
Analysis of Ranking of Dairy Bargaining 
Cooperative Objectives 1 
by George W. Ladd 
Economists are interested in the objectives of 
economic agents because information on objectives 
can be used to understand and predict behavior. 
In theoretical analyses, assumptions on objectives 
are combined with other assumptions, and the 
logical consequences of these assumptions are 
derived. The assumptions may be indirectly tested 
by comparing the predictions of the theory with 
reality. In empirical work, hypotheses on objec-
tives are used in the collection and analysis of data 
and the interpretation of the results. 
Economists have devoted little attention to the 
determination of objectives or to the relative im-
portance of various objectives. Where our ideas 
on objectives originate, it is difficult to say. Per-
haps these ideas originate from many places: 
tradition, introspection and observation, among 
others. Rarely does our information on objectives 
come directly from the economic agents them-
selves. 
The ability to predict a firm's objectives or 
ranking of objectives can be useful in predicting 
firm behavior and bargaining outcomes. The 
finding of stable relationships, if they exist, be-
tween objectives or ranking of objectives and 
characteristics of the firm, its management or its 
markets could improve our understanding of firm 
conduct. We might study economic and physical 
characteristics of the firm and its markets and 
psychological or sociological characteristics of 
management to see how they are related to a 
firm's objectives. 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study was to develop hy-
potheses on determinants of the relative im-
portance of various objectives to grade A milk 
bargaining cooperatives. The procedure followed 
in this study is almost completely the reverse of 
the normal procedure in econometric work. Usual-
ly in econometric research we have prior hy-
potheses drawn from economic theory, knowledge 
of institutions or from previous econometric work. 
The plausibility of the hypotheses has been estab-
lished before initiation of a study. During a study, 
data are collected and used to test the prior hy-
potheses, which are accepted or rejected on the 
basis of tests of significance. 
There is no prior work on determinants of ob-
1 Proj~ct 1458 ot the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experi-
ment Station. 
jectives; hence, there were no prior hypotheses 
available for testing in this study. 
We tried to learn from managers of some grade 
A milk producers' bargaining cooperatives what 
they perceived as their firm's objectives. We 
asked each manager to rank these objectives. 
Then we searched for statistically significant re-
lationships between each manager's ranking of 
each objective and various economic and physical 
characteristics of the firm. After significant re-
lationships were found, we attempted to explain 
the relationships.2 
This report summarizes the significant results 
and presents some economic evaluation of these 
results. The statistically significant results pre-
sented here are not confirmation or rejection of 
prior hypotheses. They are statements of hy-
potheses that can be investigated in future work. 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Virtually all milk consumed as fluid milk in this 
country is grade A milk.3 To qualify as a grade A 
milk producer, a farmer must meet certain stand-
ards of sanitation on his farm. In return, grade A 
milk producers receive a higher price for their 
milk than other milk producers. This study deals 
with marketing cooperatives whose members are 
grade A milk producers. These coope'ratives per-
form various services for their members. Some 
of these services are: (a) market members' milk, 
(b) bargain over prices, (c) conduct quality im-
provement and quality testing and control pro-
grams, (d) sell inputs used in milk production, (e) 
provide credit and insurance policies and (f) dis-
tribute market information. Some cooperatives 
also possess facilities for producing manufactured 
dairy products. The cooperatives also provide serv-
ices to bottlers; they perfonn functions that 
bottlers would have to perform if the coopera-
tive did not. Among these are: (a) wlite checks to 
pay individual producers, (b) maintain high-
quality milk and (c) full-supply bottlers. Bottlers' 
needs undergo large daily and seasonal variation. 
Un,der a full-supply contract, a cooperative fur-
nishes a bottler exactly the quantity of milk he 
needs daily. The cooperative obtains milk from 
, Duta used in this study were collected as part of a broader study or 
the barJl'aining activities of grade A milk producers' marketing cooper-
atives. Some results of the bro",ler study have been published (5). 
"Fluid milk includes such products as bottled or cartoned milk or 
cream, flavored milk drink., balf and half, etc. A firm prooucing 
su.ch p:OIlucts i. referred to as a bottler or handler. Butter, nonfat dry 
milk, l("e ('ream, cheese, etc., are referred to ns )rocessed or manu .. 
factured dairy )1'0IIucI8. 
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alternative sources if regular producers do not 
have enough milk. If they have too much, the co-
operative disposes of the excess. 
The cooperatives in this study operate in 
markets covered by federal milk-marketing orders. 
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 
1937, as amended, authorizes federal milk-market-
ing orders. The declared purpose of this act is to 
"establish and maintain such orderly marketing 
conditions . . • as will establish [prices which] 
are reasonable in view of the price of feeds, the 
available supplies of feeds and other economic 
conditions [and which will] insure a sufficient 
quantity of pure and wholesome milk, and be in 
the public interest." Each order regulates part of 
the operations of bottlers who sell all or a sub-
stantial part of their milk in an area defined by 
the order. The defined areas vary from a single 
city to two-thirds of the state of Nebraska. The 
main purposes of an order are to provide a for-
mula by which the order administrator computes 
the minimum prices a bottler must pay for milk 
used in various products, to provide auditing pro-
cedures to determine each bottler's use of milk 
and to provide a formula by which the minimum 
price to each producer is determined. Most orders 
contain two class prices. Class I milk is milk used 
in fluid milk and cream products. Class II milk 
is all other milk. The formulas provide that 
dealers pay a higher price for class I milk than for 
class II milk. Demand for fluid milk products is 
less price elastic (or more inelastic) than demand 
for processed dairy products. Hence, the class 
pricing plan of federal orders is a price-dis-
crimination scheme. 
There are now 76 federal milk-marketing orders. 
During 1962, 187,000 grade A milk producers 
delivered 52 billion pounds of milk (26 billion 
quarts) to handlers regulated by these orders. The 
1960 population of these market-order areas 
amounted to 60 percent of the nonfarm population 
of the continental United States. The operation of 
federal milk-marketing orders is discussed in de-
tail in United States Department of Agriculture 
Marketing Bulletin 27 (13). 
COOPERATIVE STUDY 
In the over-all study, of which this report 
covers one part, information was collected on a 
variety of topics in personal interviews with 
managers of grade A milk producers' cooperatives. 
From these managers, information for the year 
1963 was collected on: 
1. size and location of market's milkshed and 
importance of cooperative in the miIkshed and in 
the wholesale and retail milk market; 
2. mergers, consolidations or federations the co-
operative had recently participated in; 
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S. services provided members; 
4. information on market conditions collected 
by the cooperative; 
5. recent changes in the structure of retail 
and wholesale markets served by the cooperative; 
6. principal and alternative markets for mem-
bers' milk, prices in and transportation costs to 
each market; 
7. milk handlers' alternative sources of milk 
and price differentials; 
8. services offered handlers; 
9. participation in legal or administrative pro-
ceedings; 
10. attitudes toward a milk strike; and 
11. objectives of the cooperative. 
The cooperatives studied were not selected by 
random sampling. They were selected purposely to 
assure coverage of a wide range of operating con-
ditions and bargaining results at reasonable total 
travel costs. The cooperatives studied are alilocat-
ed in the Midwest; they are listed in Ladd and 
Hallberg (5). Although the sample was not ran-
dom, inferences will be drawn from the statistical 
estimates. 
COOPERATIVE OBJECTIVES 
A list of seven objectives of grade A milk 
producers' cooperatives was developed after 
thorough discussions with the cooperative man-
agers and with people who have worked closely 
with cooperatives in advisory capacities. Each 
cooperative manager interviewed was then asked 
to rank each objective in accordance with the im-
portance of that objective to his cooperative. Of 
the ten managers interviewed, nine answered this 
question. We tried to include every perceived ob-
jective of every cooperative manager interviewed, 
and no manager suggested we had left off an im-
portant objective. The seven objectives are: 
1. negotiating a price that will give members 
the highest possible net return for their milk, 
2. maintaining a market for members' milk 
(i.e., assuring members they will always be able 
to sell their milk), 
3. maintaining past highest percentage of class 
I sales, 
4. securing 100-percent control of milk pro-
duced in cooperative's procurement area, 
5. increasing the size of procurement area, 
6. negotiating for the estimated value of serv-
ices provided handlers and 
7. maintaining good relations with handlers. 
In theories of cooperative behavior, the first 
objective occupies the same status that the profit-
maximization objective occupies in theories of pro-
prietary firms. Objective 3 is included because 
farmers receive a higher price for class I milk 
than for other milk. Federal orders provide 
minimum, but not maximum prices. Cooperatives 
must be reimbursed for the services they provide 
dealers. Adequate reimbursement may require an 
above-order price. Therefore, objective 6 is in-
cluded. The proximity of a large number of grade 
A producers who are not members of the coopera-
tive may result in members deciding membership 
is not worth what it costs and withdrawing from 
the cooperative. Nonmembers are also a competi-
tive source of supply. If numerous, they reduce 
the bargaining power of the cooperative. There-
fore, objective 4 is included. Objective 5 is in-
cluded for a similar reason: Producers who are 
outside the area covered by the cooperative's 
membership are competitive sources of supply. 
In the United States as a whole, and in most 
fluid milk markets, production of grade A milk 
substantially exceeds consumption of class I pro-
ducts (made from grade A milk). Class II pro-
ducts can be made from milk other than grade A 
milk. Some bottlers could obtain all the milk they 
need from sources other than the cooperative 
regularly supplying them simply by paying a class 
I price to distant cooperatives for milk that the 
cooperatives are otherwise selling at class II 
prices for manufactured dairy products. This is a 
main reason for including objectives 2 and 7. 
Also, milk production undergoes sizable seasonal 
variation. The number of producers required to 
meet a bottler's needs in the months of short pro-
duction exceeds the number required in months of 
flush production. If a cooperative did not perform 
the function in objective 2, some members might 
have no outlet for their milk during part of each 
year. 
Table 1 presents the ranks assigned by the co-
operative managers. In the first column, the ob-
jectives are numbered as they were in the preced-
ing text. Each other column (except the last) 
indicates how a cooperative ranked the objectives. 
The smaller the assigned number, the more im-
portant this objective is to the manager. A com-
monly used measure of the degree of agreement 
between two rankings is the Spearman rank-
correlation coefficient 
6~d12 
p.=1------
N (N2_1) 
where d; is the difference between the two rank-
ings of the i-th item, and N is the number of items 
ranked. ps may vary from - 1, indicating perfect 
negative correlation, to + 1, indicating perfect 
positive correlation. When the number of rankings 
exceeds two, Kendall's coefficient of concordance, 
W, may be used (4, p. 95) to test the null hy-
pothesis that the rankings are independent of 
each other. W may vary from 0 to + 1. The data 
in table 1 yield a value of W = 0.615, significant 
at the 1-percent level. The null hypothesis, there-
fore, is rejected. There is reason to believe that 
the nine managers were applying basically the 
same standards in ranking these objectives. One 
estimate of this standard suggested by Kendall 
(4) is the pooled ranking. This is obtained by 
ranking each objective according to the sum of 
the ranks assigned to it, the one with the smallest 
sum being ranked first. If the sums are equal for 
two or more objectives, these objectives are rank-
ed according to the sums of squares of the in-
dividual ranks assigned these objectives. The last 
column of table 1 shows the pooled ranks. Of the 
nine rankings by the managers, five are signifi-
cantly correlated with the pooled rank at the 5-
percent level. 
These results tell us that there is some, but not 
perfect, agreement among the ranks assigned by 
the various cooperative managers. The rest of this 
study is an investigation of variations among 
rankings. 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RAN KINGS 
Single-Equation Models 
Linear regressions of the form 
Ykl = Ilk + ~ PIX ll + £kl 
i 
Table 1. Ranks assigned to variaus abjectlves by managers of each af nine dairy bargaining coaperatives. 
Ranks assigned by manager of cooperative" Pooled 
Objective 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ranking 
I ........................ I 3 5 4 2.5 2.5 I 5 I 2 
2 ........................ 2 I 1.5 I 2.5 1 2 3 2 I 
3 ........................ 5 2 3 3 2.5 4 3 4 4 3 
4 ........................ 4 4 4 6 5 7 6 I 6.5 5 
5 ........................ 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 6.5 7 
6 ........................ 3 6 6 5 6 5 5 6 3 6 
7 ........................ 6 5 1.5 2 2.5 2.5 4 2 5 4 
Rank correlation between cooperative ranking' and pooled rankingb 
0.643 0.929 0.704 0.821 0.889 0.830 0.929 0.393 0.722 
• Tied rankings are each assigned the average of the ranks they would have been assigned if no ties had occurred. 
b Spearman rank-correlation coefficient corrected for tied ranking.. To be significilnt It the S-percent level this coefficient m\lst equal or exceed 
O.7~O tnd, 41t the 10-percent level, 0.626. 
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were fitted, where Ykj is the rank assigned objec-
tive k (k = 1, 2, ... ,7, numbere,d as in table 1) 
by cooperative manager j (j = 1, 2, ' .. , 9), XIj is 
the value of variable Xi for cooperative j; and Ilk) 
is a normally and independently distributed ran-
dom error with mean zero and variance 0'2. The 
X1/s considered for inclusion in regressions are: 
X IJ = percentage of the local handlers with 
which cooperative j attempted to bargain 
in 1963 who would bargain; 
X ~i = average volume per handler with which 
cooperative j bargained in 1963 (in mil-
lions of pounds) ; 
X aj = estimated 1963 average annual value to 
cooperative j's handlers of obtaining milk 
from cooperative j rather than from 
more distant alternative sources; 
X ,Ij = 1 if X3 less the negotiated premium on 
class I milk is at least as large as the 
value of services provided handlers-
= 0 otherwise; 
X oj = cooperative j's estimate of the value of 
services provided handlers in cents per 
hundredweight; 
X Hj -= cooperative j's distance from Eau Claire, 
Wisconsin; 
X 7] = percentage of cooperative j's volume re-
placeable from alternative sources; 
X Rj = handlers' buying price for 3.5-percent 
producer milk used for fluid purposes in 
1963 in cents per hundredweight; 
X V] = percentage of cooperative j's volume sold 
to class I outlets; 
XIOJ = annual average 1963 negotiated premium 
on class I milk in cents per hundred-
weight; 
Xlii = number of class I handlers who would 
bargain with cooperative j in 1963; 
XUi = cooperative j's volume as a percentage of 
the total volume in the cooperative's 
procurement area (estimated by the co-
operative) ; 
XI:lJ = percentage of cooperative j's volume that 
could have been handled in the coopera-
tive's own processing plant; 
XUJ = cooperative j's total membership (grade 
A producers only) ; 
XI:;j = per capita income in the major metro-
politan area served by cooperative j; 
XI"i = approximate number of dairy cows per 
thousand crop acres in cooperative j's 
procurement area in 1962; 
X l7j = 1 for cooperatives located in an area 
where labor union activity was assumed 
relatively high -
= 0 otherwise; 
X~6j = X9j 2; and 
X 27j =X2J 2, 
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Selected regression results follow. Here and in 
later sections, results were selected for presenta-
tion according to the criterion: An equation 
should have a relatively large R2 and a high pro-
portion of significant coefficients. With the ex-
ception of the few cases discussed in the para-
graph immediately after equation 7.B, economic 
criteria were not used in selecting equations. In a 
later discussion, equations 1.A, 2.A, ... , 7.A are 
treated as one set; equations 1.B, 2.B, ... , 7.B 
are treated as another set. The equation numbered 
3.A and 3.B is common to both sets. For each 
equation, R~ is the conventional coefficient of 
determination. In equations in which ak =1= 0, R2 
measures the proportion of variation in Yk about 
the mean of Yk that is accounted for by the re-
gression. In equations in which ak = 0 (Le., homo-
geneous regression, R2 measures the proportion 
of variation in Y1, about zero that is accounted for 
by the regression. For every k and j, 1.0 < Yki < 
7.0, and YkJ is integer or integer plus half. The Ykj 
estimated from the regressions (denoted as est 
Y1<J) need not possess either of these properties. 
This limits the usefulness of R2 as a measure of 
goodness of fit, since R2 is a measure of an equa-
tion's ability to predict magnitude; but the rele-
vant criterion here is how well an equation pre-
dicts ordering. 
For each equation, po is the rank correlation 
between the actual rankings of the objective by 
the nine managers and the estimated rankings 
from the equation. The transformations perform-
ed on the data to compute po are illustrated in 
table 2 by using objective 1 as an example, The 
values of Ylj are the values of the dependent 
variable in equation 1.A; est Y1/s are the esti-
mates of Ylj from equation 1.A. To compute po the 
Yt/s were ranked, as in column 2; the est Y1j's 
were also ranked, as in column 4. po is the rank 
correlation between columns 2 and 4. 
In table 2, column RY IJ shows how each man-
ager ranked objective 1 compared with the ranks 
assigned by other managers. For example, man· 
agel'S of cooperatives 5 and 6 assigned the same 
rank to objective 1; they assigned a lower rank 
than did managers of cooperatives 1, 7 and 9; they 
assigned a higher rank to this objective than did 
managers of cooperatives 2, 3, 4 and 8. Column R 
est Y'j shows how equation 1.A estimated the 
rank assigned by each manager compared with 
the rank assigned by other managers. The equa-
tion estimated that cooperative 1 assigned a high-
er rank to objective 1 than did any other man-
ager, that manager 9 ranked it lower than man-
ager 1 but higher than any other manager, etc. 
In this report, a triple asterisk, *** denotes 
significance at the I-percent level (refe;red to as 
highly significant) ; ** denotes significance at the 
5-percent level (referred to as significant) ; lie de-
T_hle 2. Example 0' computation of /10 for equations in sets A and B. 
Ylj 
cooperatives 
ranking of 
Cooperative j obiective 1 
I ...................................... I 
2 ...................................... 3 
3 ....................•..•...•.......... 5 
4 ...................................... 4 
5 ..............•....••................. 2.5 
6 ...................................... 2.5 
7 ••..•....•••...•...•.................. 1 
8 ...................................... 5 
9 ....•................................. I , , 
~': 
~""'T 
RYlj 
reordered 
rankings 
2 
6 
8.5 
7 
4.5 
4.5 
2 
8.5 
2.0 
est Vo from 
equation I.A 
0.548 
2.298 
3.318 
3.951 
3.275 
4.009 
2.094 
3.994 
1.513 
Rest Ylj 
ranked est Ylj 
. 
4 
6 
7 
5 
9 
3 
8 
2 
di = 
RYlj - Rest Ylj 
1 
2 
2.5 
o 
-0.5 
-4.5 
-1 
0.5 
o 
dj' • 
'RYlj - Rest Vlj)" 
1.00 
4.00 
6.25 
0.00 
0.25 
20,25 
1.00 
0.25 
0.00 
33.00 
...4~'- 6 ~ d/ 33.00 
-
Po = 1 - ---- = 1 - --- = 0.725 
N:N'-I) 720 
notes significance at the 10-percent level (referred 
to as barely significant). The term not significant 
means not significant at the 10-percent level. 
Selected results are: 
(1.A) est Y1i = -0.014 XSj - 0.021 XI3j + 9.75 
<0.018) (0.013) (7.66) 
R2 = 0.58*, po = 0.72** 
(l.B) est Ylj = -0.035 XlSj + 0.0044 XlSj 
(2.A) 
(2.B), 
(3.A) 
and 
(3.B) 
(4.A) 
(4.B) 
(4.C) 
(5.A) 
- 6.45 
(4.68) 
<0.009) *** (0.0020) * 
R2 = 0.74**, po = 0.98*** 
est Y21 = 0.047 X 2j - 0.024 XUJ + 2.63 
(0.020) * (0.007) ,~* (0.58) *** 
R2 = 0.73**, po = 0.83*** .... , 
est Y2J = -0.29 X2J + 0.097 XU1 
(0.11)* <0.017)*** 
- 0.00074 X 26j + 0.011 X 21 j, 
<0.00016) *** (0.004) ** 
R2 = 0.98***, po = 0.87*** 
est Y"j = -0.016 X Uj + 0.019 XlGJ 
(0.012) (0.009) ** 
+ 3.79, R2 = 0.55*, po = 0.60** 
(0.93) *** 
est Y4j = -0.084 X 2j + 0.088 XOj 
(0.070) <0.018) *** 
R!! = 0.91 ***, po = 0.46* 
est Y 4j = -0.62 X2J + 0.25 X Uj 
<0.44) (0.06) *** 
- 0.0014 X2Gj + 0.015 X21j 
(0.0006) * (0.015) 
R2 = 0.96***, po = 0.77*** 
est Y~j = -0.19 X2i + 0.23 XSj 
(0.07) ~,* (0.06) **>iI 
- 0.0015 X26j 
(0.0006) * 
R2 = 0.95***, po = 0.39 
...... 
est Y 51 = Y = 6.83 = mean of ranks 
assigned objective five 
(5.B) est Y5j = -0.0032 XU1 + 0.018 XSj 
(0.0011) ** (0.001) *** 
R2 = 0.99***, po = 0.62** 
(6.A) est YUJ = 0.054 XIj, R" = 0.96***, 
(0.004) *** 
po = 0.59** 
(6.B) est Y 6j = 0.035 Xu + 1.81, 
(0.016) M (1.51) 
R2 =: 0.39*, po = 0.59** 
(6.C) est Y6j = 0.055 Xu - 0.0053 X2j , 
(0.014) *** <0.074) 
R2 = 0.96***, po = 0.39 
(7.A) est Y1j = 0.061 XlSj ' 
(0.011) *** 
R2 = 0.81 ***, po = 0.79*** 
(7.B) est Y;j = 0.0072 Xllj + 0.029 X l'lj 
(0.0034) * (0.005) *** 
+ 2.01 
(0.23)*** 
R2 = 0.93***, po = 0.78*** 
Deleting ak from equation LA (Le., estimating 
a homogeneous regression) made the coefficient of 
X~J positive and significant and made the coef-
ficient of XI~j significant. Deletion of ak from 
equation 2.A made the coefficient of Xo positive 
and nonsignificant. Deletion of a" from equation 
3.A made the coefficient of Xo positive and signif-
icant. In a later section, Economic Interpretation 
of Results, the economic implications of the 
statistical results will be considered. I wiII argue 
there that the signs of the coefficients of XBJ and 
XOj obtained in equations 1.A, 2.A and 3.A are 
easier to explain than the signs obtained when tl!i\ 
was deleted. 
Setting a!< = 0 implies Y1,; = 0 if all X's in the 
regression are set at zero. Y1'i = 0 does not make 
sense in the present context since Y1<i >= 1.0 by 
specification. And it is also difficult to see what it 
means to say that the X's in these equations are 
zero. 
Variables Xa!> X7h XSh X10lo Xll ], X131 and XHj 
are all significantly correlated with Y7J • X7J is neg-
atively correlated with Y,j; the others are posi-
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Tab!. 3. Example· of computation of Pc for intracooparative rankings. 
Ykl 
dk 
Equation 
Objective 
k 
ranking of objective 
k by cooperative 1 est Ykl 
r(est Ykl) 
ranked (est Ykl) Ykl - r:est Ykl} 
1.A ......................... _ ... l 
2.A .............................. 2 
3.A .............................. 3 
4.A ........•...••••......•...••.• 4 
5.A .............................. 5 
6.A .............................. 6 
7.A .............................. 7 
1.0 
2.0 
5.0 
4.0 
7.0 
3.0 
6.0 
0.55 
2.17 
4.86 
3.46 
6.83 
5.25 
6.11 
6(6) 
1 
2 
4 
3 
7 
5 
6 
o 
o 
1 
1 
o 
-2 
o 
o 
o 
I 
1 
o 
4 
o 
Pc = 1 - -- = 0.B9 
7 (4B) 
tively correlated. Several of these X/s are also 
highly correlated with each other. 
Each of these equations shows how each co-
operative ranks a given objective in comparison 
with the rank assigned that objective by other co-
operatives. This may be useful information, but 
it would also be useful to be able to predict how 
each cooperative would rank a given objective in 
relation to other objectives. There seems no way to 
directly get at this. In the regression model in 
matrix notation Y = Xp + po, Y is an n by one 
vector of observations on the dependent variable, 
X is an n x p matrix of observations. If we define 
Y as the 7 by one vector of rankings assigned the 
objectives by one cooperative, then X is a vector, 
not a matrix, of observations. We can get at the 
issue indirectly by determining how well equation 
set A or equation set B predicts the rankings for 
each cooperative. For cooperative j we can use the 
equations to compute est Yk/s (k = 1, 2, ... , 7), 
rank these and compute pc, their correlation with 
the actual rankings by cooperative j. The pro-
cedure is illustrated in table 3 by using equation 
set A and cooperative 1. 
Table 4 presents the results for equation sets 
A and B. All rank correlation coefficients in table 
4 are significant. Comparison of the values of P6 
with values of po indicates that the equations do 
better at predicting intracooperative rankings 
(table 4) than at predicting intercooperative rank-
ings, although they were estimated by using inter-
Tabl. 4. Rank correlations between ranking of objectiv.. by each 
cooperative and predicted rankings from equation •• ts A 
and I. 
Cooperative number 
Pc from 
equation set A" 
1.................................................. 0.89 
2.................................................. 0.93 
3.................................................. O.BB 
4.................................................. 0.93 
5.................................................. 0.91 
6.................................................. 0.85 
7.................................................. 0.96 
B.................................................. 0.96 
9.................................................. 0.91 
Pc from 
equation set Bb 
0.90 
1.00 
0.96 
0.96 
0.91 
0.B3 
0.96 
1.00 
0.99 
• All significant at the l·percent level. 
b All significant at the l·percent level, except Pc for cooperOlive 6, 
which Is significant at the 5-percent level. 
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cooperative data. The results do suggest that in-
formation on the characteristics of a cooperative 
and its market area can be used to determine how 
that cooperative will rank its objectives. 
Multiple.Equation ModeP 
The preceding least-squares regressions take 
no account of the relation between ranks as-
signed various objectives by a given manager. 
The rank a manager assigns objective k may be 
affected by, or determined simultaneously with, 
the rank he assigns objective t. 
The equations considered in this section are of 
the form 
Yk1 = ~ PkrYrj + ~ j'kIXU + j'kO + 8k1 
r i 
They differ from those used in the previous sec-
tion in the inclusion of the rankings of more than 
one objective in each equation. The Ykj and YrJ 
are endogenous variables. In the analysis here, 
all Xij will be treated as exogenous variables al-
though it is recognized that some of the Xu may 
be influenced by the Yk1 and should, therefore, 
properly be treated as endogenous. If the Xu and 
Y T ) are known and the P's and j"s have been 
estimated, this equation can be used to estimate 
ranks assigned objective k. 
Having a system of such equations, consisting 
of one equation for each objective, one could also 
compute po (as in table 2) for each objective and 
po (as in table 3) for each cooperative. This, how-
ever, was not done in this study. The reduced form 
equations could be used to study all objectives 
simultaneously. 
For estimating equations that have more than 
one endogenous variable, least-squares coefficients 
are biased, but possess relatively small variance; 
simultaneous equation estimates of coefficients 
are consistent, but possess larger variance. The 
mere fact that one's estimates are consistent, 
which is a large sample property, does not offer 
much comfort when the sample has only nine 
• Multiple f:Quation models and simultaneous equations methods of estl. 
mation are discussed in Johnston (3), Tintner (12) and other econo-
metriclI texts. 
observations. The smaller variance of least-
squares estimates seems more important. When 
the R2 is as large as it is in many of the equations 
in this study, the bias in the least-squares esti-
mates may be expected to be fairly small. The 
equations that follow were all estimated by 
least squares. 
(4.D) est Y'J = - 0.23 X2J + 0.086 X9J 
+ 1.62Y2! 
<0.55)** 
(0.07) ** (0.012) *** 
R2 = 0.96***, po = 0.70** 
(4.E) est Y'l = -0.16 X2J + 0.048 X9J 
(0.07) ** (0.023) * 
+ 0.62Y6J 
(0.28)* 
R2 = 0.95***, po = 0.42 
(5.D) est YSj = -0.0038 X6j + 0.020 Xu 
(0.0009) *** (0.001) *** 
- 0.13 Y'J 
(0.05)* 
R2 = 0.99***, po = 0.77*** 
(6.D) est Y6j = 0.041 Xu + 0.41 Yu 
(0.008) **'" (0.22) * 
R2 = 0.98***, po = 0.75*** 
The use of least-squares regression in studying 
variations in rankings, as was done here, en-
counters three difficulties: (a) One difficulty that 
arises is the selection of a measure of goodness of 
fit. This has two aspects: 1) R2 is not a good 
measure of goodness of fit to ranked data. There 
were several cases in which two equations for the 
same objective had nearly equal values of R2, but 
one had a much larger value of po than did the 
other. Equations 4.B and 4.C, 6.A and 6.C and 
4.D and 4.E are examples. 2) An additional vari-
able cannot reduce R2, but it may reduce po. Equa-
tions 4.A and 4.E and 6.A and 6.C are examples. 
(b) The second difficulty-the validity of the t 
ratio as a test of significance of a coefficient-is 
related to the first. A variable whose coefficient is 
nonsignificant by the t test may substantially in-
crease po. Equations 4.A and 4.B are examples. On 
the other hand, a variable that is significant by 
the t test may have little effect on Po; see equa-
tions 7.A and 7.B. (c) The final difficulty is that 
the values of R2 and po have weaknesses as 
measures of intracooperative accuracy of estima-
tion. This happened in more than one instance. Set 
E. of the equations consisted of one equation for 
every objective; set E2 also consisted of one equa-
tion for every objective. All of the equations in E2 
were different from the equations in E1• In set El 
every R2 and po equalled or exceeded the R2 and 
po for the same objective for the equations in E 2• 
When the two sets were used as in table 4 to com-
pute intracooperative rankings and pc, most PIl'S 
computed from set E2 exceeded the po's computed 
from set E 1• The use of discriminant analysis 
would avoid some of these problems. 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
Suppose we were studying annual family auto-
mobile purchases; we know that families can be 
classified into one of four classes: 
(a) bought no automobile during year, 
(b) bought a used automobile only, 
(c) bought a new automobile only and 
(d) bought more than one automobile. 
Then we might be interested in the question: 
Having information on family size, income, com-
position and place of residence, and number and 
age of automobiles owned at the first of the 
year, can we predict to which class this family 
will belong? Discriminant analysis is a procedure 
for attacking this type of question. 
Assume there are no ties in the cooperative's 
rankings of objective k. Then one could set up 
seven classes: 1) cooperatives ranking k number 
1, 2) cooperatives ranking k number 2, . . ., 7) 
cooperatives ranking k number 7. This could be 
done for each objective and discriminant analysis 
carried out for each objective. Less than seven 
classes would usually be enough. The presence of 
ties requires redefinition of classes or addition of 
other classes. 
Because of the limited number of observations, 
only two classes were used in each discriminant 
analysis in this study. Because of the limited 
variability in rankings assigned objective 5, it was 
not analyzed. In the analysis of objective 6, co-
operatfves ranking that objective above its pooled 
rank were assigned to class one; all others were 
assigned to class two. In the analyses of each of 
the other objectives, class one consisted of those 
cooperatives assigning the objective a rank equal 
to or higher than its pooled rank; others were 
in class two. 
Single-Equation Models 
For objective k define the variables: 
Xill = t-th observation in class j on i-th X 
valiable; 
i = 1, 2, ... , p; j = 1, 2,; t = 1, 2, ... , NJ 
~ X ljt 
t 
Xij' = = mean of Xl in class j 
NJ 
Yklt = t-th observation in class j on variable Yk 
N2 
Yk1t =----
Nt + N2 
Nt yk2t=-----
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Table 5. Est Ykjt for objectives 1,2,3,4 and 7. 
Clan Observation Objective 1 Objective 
j t eq. I,H eq. 2.H 
1 ............................ 1 .............................. 0.6228 0.3451 
2 .............................. 0.1894b 0.3660 
3 .............................. 0.6228 0.0252" 
4 .............................. 
5 .............................. 
6 .............................. 
Mean .......................... 0.4783 0.2454 
2 ............................ 1 .............................. -0.3623 -0.4683 
2 .............................. -0.2145· 0.1673' 
3 .............................. -0.3623 -0.4206 
4 .............................. -0.3623 0.1673b 
5 .............................. -0.3623 -0.0080 
6 .............................. 0.2288" -0.1738 
Mean .......................... -0.2392 -0.1227 
Average of 
two meillns ...................... 0.1196 0.0614 
• Cooperative number 3: misclassified in functions 2.H and 4.J. 
b Cooperative number 5: misclassified in equation 2.H. 
• Cooperative number 8: misclassified in functions 1.H, 2.H and 3.H. 
If we estimate the coefficients in the regression 
equation with a dummy dependent variable 
Ykjt = Po + ~ P1Xijt + ejt 
i 
the expression 
est YI,jt = bo + ~ blXijt 
is a discriminant function; bo and b i are estimates 
of Po and Pi. Any observation for which 
est Ykit ;;;. bo + % ~ b i (XIl • + Xi2.) 
i 
is classified into group one; any observation for 
which 
est Ykit < bo + % ~ bl (XII' + X I2.) 
i 
is classified into group two.~ 
An R2 can be computed for a discriminant func-
tion, just as for a conventional regression. The 
significance of a discriminant function can be 
tested by using the same variance (F) ratio as is 
used to test a conventional regression. 
Selected results follow. 
(1.H) est Yljt = 0.00985 Xl3Jt - 0.362, 
R2= 0.72*** 
This equation indicates that cooperatives with 
large values of Xl3 tended to rank objective 1 re-
latively high; i.e., in class one. 
(1.J) est Yljt = 0.00287 Xojt - 0.935, 
R2= 0.55** 
When used alone, both X6 and Xu are significant 
discriminators, but the addition of Xo to equation 
1.H did not significantly improve the discrimi-
nating ability of that equation. This may be be-
cause of the correlation of 0.73 between X" and 
XI:" 
(2.H) est Y2jt = 0.000117 X26jt - 0.581, 
R2 = 0.37* 
I Discriminant functions are discussed In: George W. Ladd. Linear 
probabllity funct.ions and dlscrlminant functions. Econometrica (In 
press). 1:166. 
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2 Objective 3 Objective 4 Objective 7 
eq. 3.H eq. 4.J eq. 7.H 
0.4445' -0.1535' 0.3333 
0.4445b 0.5077 0.3128' 
0.4445 0.1466 0.3333 
0.4445 0.3183" 0.0780b 
-0.3555" 0.5667 0.2940 
0.3987 
0.2845 0.2717 0.2917 
-0.3555 -0.6071 -0.4358 
-0.3555 -0.1247 -0.4075· 
-0.3555 -0.1499b -0.9071 
-0.3555 -0.5037 
-0.3555 -0.3464 -0.5835 
-0.0355 -0.0374 -0.1459 
X"' with a positive coefficient, yielded a discrim-
inant function for objective 2 that was signifi-
cant at the 11-percent level. 
(3.H) est Yajt = 0.800 X4Jt - 0.356, 
(3.J) 
(4.H) 
(4.J) 
(7.H) 
(7.J) 
(7.K) 
R2=0.64*** 
est YaJt = 0.0149 Xojt - 1.006, R2 = 0.36* 
est Y 4Jt = 0.0451 X2jt - 0.743, R2 = 0.43* 
est Y4jt = -0.00862 X7jt + 0.00152 X27j ( 
+ 0.253, R2 = 0.62* 
est Y7jt = -0.00873 XlOjt - 0.00573 X13jt 
+ 0.399, R2 = 0.88*** 
est Y 7jt = 0.0138 X7j( - 1.192, R2 = 0.57** 
est Y7jt = -0.00552 XllJt + 0.227, 
R2= 0.51** 
Variables X., XlO , Xu and Xl8 are all significant 
discriminators of rankings of objective 7, but are 
highly cOITelated with each other. None of the 
variables used was a significant discriminator of 
rankings assigned objective 6. 
Table 5 presents values of the discriminant 
functions computed from equations l.H to 7.K. 
Equations 1.H, 3.H and 4.J each classify one co-
operative incorrectly; three cooperatives are J;nis-
classified by equation 2.H. 
Multiple-Equation Model 
The preceding discriminant~analysis results 
classify each cooperative with regard to only one 
objective at a time, independently of how it may 
rank other obj ectives. This is the way in which 
discriminant analysis is conventionally used: An 
item must be classified into one group or another; 
it is not classified into each of several groups. 
We now turn to the question of whether know-
ledge of the group a cooperative falls in on one 
objective may be used to classify that cooperative 
into the proper group for another objective. The 
function now is 
Ykjt='1.f3krYrjt + lYklXljt + YI,O + Ekjt· 
r i 
If we have data on the XUt and Yrjt and have 
estimates of the f3's and y'S, this function can be 
used. Compute 
(8) est YkJ t = l ~l' Yl'jt + '1. CkiXijt + CkO, 
The cooperative is classified in group one with 
respect to objective k if 
est Y1eJt » lJ2[ l b1<r(Yrl ' + Yr2.) 
+ ~ Cl<i (XiI' + Xi2.) ] + CkO 
and is classified in group two otherwise. Yrj • is the 
mean of Yrjt for all cooperatives classed in group 
l' (= 1, 2) with respect to objective k. 
If we have data only on the Xij( or if we want to 
classify a cooperative with respect to all objectives 
simultaneously, a different procedure must be 
used. The system of discriminant functions for a 
given cooperative consists of the system of equa-
tions 
f3Y=rX + E 
where Y is the column vector (YO (, Y2jt, ... , 
Y7jt)', X is the column vector (XliI, X2jt , ••• , 
X!d!)' and f3 and r are coefficient matrices. The 
subscript pair, jt, must be interpreted as a unit to 
mean a given cooperative. Let Band C be the 
estimates of f3 and r in the discriminant function 
system. If B is nonsingular, we compute the 
reduced form equations 
est Y = B-'CX = PX 
(9) estYkjt=lPkiXijt +Po 
i 
Compute 
Po + lh '1. P ki (XII' + X i2.) = YkO 
The cooperative is classified into group one if 
est Ykjt » YkO 
and is placed in group two if 
est Ykit < YkO 
Although not done in this study, the est Ykjt 
from equations 8 or 9 could also be used to com-
pute po for each objective (as in table 2) and pc for 
each cooperative (as in table 3). 
Selected discriminant functions follow: 
(1.L) est Y1jt = 0.00615 X13i ! - 0.423 Y2jt 
+ 0.464 Yr,jt - 0.226, R2 = 0.97*** 
(1.M) est YJj\ = 0.00162 Xnjt - 0.3699 Y2jt 
+ 0.5721 Yr,jt - 0.526, R2 = 0.88** 
The addition of Y2it and Yell to equations l.H 
and l.J to obtain equations l.L and l.M increased 
discrimination ability by significant amounts. 
Yilt' the rank of objective 7, was added to 
functions for objective 2. Its addition did not 
significantly improve the equation. Yall and Y7j t/ 
singly and in combination, were added to equa-
tions 3.H and 3.J. Neither way did their addition 
significantly improve the equations. 
(4.L) est Y4i ! = 0.0220 X2j ! - 0.63 Yui \ - 0.362, 
R2=0.71** 
. 
Addition of Y"i t increased R2 by a significant 
amount. 
(4.M) est Yijt = -0.00833 X7jt + 0.000700 X27jt 
- 0.618 Yuit + 0.492, R2 = 0.89**':' 
Addition of YQjt increased R2 by a significant 
~OO~. . 
(6.L) est Y6jt = 0.444 Ylit - 0.667 Y4jt 
+ 0.00008, W = 0.80**':' 
No discriminant function for objective 6 using 
only X's was significant; equation 6.L is highly 
significant. . 
(7.L) est Y7i \ = -0.00330 X lOjt - 0.0153 X I * 
+ 0.699 Ylit + 0.636, R2 = 0.97*':'* 
Addition of Yljt resulted in a significant in-
crease in R2. Addition of Y1jt to X7jt or X"jt did 
not significantly increase R2. 
Functions l.L to 7.L were used to classify each 
cooperative. Results are in table 6. None of the co-
operatives is misclassified. 
Table 6. Simultaneous discriminant functions Yk it = ~ PkrY rjt + 
~ 'YkiXUt + 'YkO + 'kjt evaluated fo~ individual coopera· 
tives and at group means. 
Class Observation Objective 1 Objective 4 Objective 6 Objective 7 
j t eq. l.l eq. 4.M eq. 6.l eq. 7.l 
1 .................. 1.............. 0.7359 
2.............. 0.4652 
3.............. 0.7359 
4 ............. . 
5 ............ .. 
6 ............. . 
Class mean........ 0.6457 
2 .................. 1 .............. -0.3017 
2 .............. -0.2507 
3 .............. -0.3430 
4 .............. -0.3017 
5 .............. -0.3430 
6 .............. -0.3964 
Class mean ........ -0.3228 
Average of 
class means........ 0.1614 
0.2128 
0.5178 
0.3513 
0.6961 
0.2009 
0.3958 
-0.6148 
-0.3924 
-0.4040 
-0.5672 
-0.4947 
-0.0494 
0.6667 
0.2223 
0.6667 
0.2223 
0.0001 
0.3556 
-0.4444 
-0.4444 
-0.4444 
-0.4444 
-0.4444 
-0.0444 
0.3777 
0.1722 
0.3777 
0.2422 
0.3629 
0.4025 
0.3225 
-0.5321 
-0.6933 
-0.7102 
-0.6452 
-0.1614 
The system consisting of equations l.L, 2.H, 
3.H, 4.M, 6.L and 7.L was used in another way. 
Equation 9 was computed, and eachcooperntive 
was classified for each objective according to 
whether or not est Ykjt exceeded YkO• The reduced-
form equations for objectives 1 and 7 misclassified 
no cooperatives. The equations for objectives 2, 3, 
4 and 6 misclassified 3, 1, 1 and 3 cooperatives, 
respectively. 
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION 
OF REGRESSION AND DISCRIMINANT RESULTS 
For brevity in this dicussioll, regression analy-
sis results will be termed RA. and discriminant 
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analysis, D.A. For a given objective R.A. and D.A. 
are consistent concerning Xlji if its R.A. coef-
ficient is of opposite sign from its D.A. coefficient. 
In interpreting the regression results, remember 
that a small value of the dependent variable in-
dicates a high rank. 
Objective 1 (Negotiating High Price) 
x. (= distance from Eau Claire) 
The coefficient of X6 was positive in D.A., but 
negative and nonsignificant in R.A. The finding 
that cooperatives located at a greater distance 
from Eau Claire place objective 1 relatively high 
can be explained on the following grounds. 
The volume of grade A milk produced far ex-
ceeds the consumption of products that must be 
made from grade A milk; there is much surplus 
grade A milk. The heart of this surplus-production 
area is around Eau Claire, Wisconsin. Federal-
order formula prices and actual prices received 
by farmers for milk for fluid uses are low in the 
Minnesota-Wisconsin area and tend to rise with 
increasing distance from this area. 
In discussing objective 1, managers may have 
been thinking of unconstrained maximization-
of "high" net returns. The ability to negotiate a 
high price is limited by nearness to the surplus 
grade A production area. The managers' and co-
operative members' recognition of their lesser 
ability to negotiate for high prices may have af-
fected the aspiration level of managers and co-
operative members relatively close to Eau Claire 
and have led them to place less importance on 
objective 1. It has been established that aspiration 
level is a function of expectations (9). 
Probably managers had in mind maximization 
subject to constraints imposed by the physical 
productivity of the cooperative and its members, 
by factor prices, by constraints subject to the 
control of the cooperative, such as size of pro-
cessing plant, and by "average" or "normal" con-
ditions in processing and marketing fluid products. 
The degree of attainment of this constrained 
maximum is affected by the ability of the bottlers 
to obtain milk economically from alternate sources. 
The ability of the bottlers close to Eau Claire to do 
this is generally greater than the ability of distant 
bottlers to do it. On this interpretation, as on the 
preceding one, the ranking of objective 1 is af-
fected by expected achievement. 
x. (= average elass I price) 
R.A. of equation 1.A indicates that cooperatives 
with high class I prices tend to rank objective 1 
relatively high. This may be related to aspirations 
and expectations. Cooperatives whose members 
have received relatively high class I prices in the 
past expect to receive them in the future. High ex-
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pectations tend to lead to high aspirations. High 
class I prices are an important factor in high net 
returns. 
A positive R.A. coefficient of XSj indicates that 
receipt of low class I prices leads to placing more 
importance on objective 1. This is inconsistent 
with the evidence on aspiration levels-unless, in 
the markets with low class I prices, the prices still 
exceed production costs by more than class I 
prices exceed production costs in markets with 
high class I prices. 
XI) (= size of cooperative's processing plant) 
Cooperatives that own processing facilities 
sufficient to handle large proportions of their 
members' milk tend to rank objective 1 relatively 
high. The two are probably related in this way: 
Cooperatives for whom maximum net member re-
turns are important tend to have large processing 
plants because this is one way of increasing 
returns. The cooperative receives a greater return 
from producing manufactured products in a large 
plant of its own than it receives from sale of milk 
to other processing plants. Possession of a proc-
essing plant may also be a tool for bargaining 
for higher prices. If a cooperative withholds milk 
from bottlers, the milk must normally go into 
lower-valued manufactured products. The result-
ing loss to members is less for cooperatives own-
ing their own processing facilities. Two-thirds of 
the cooperatives we studied would not call a milk 
strike. Most had facilities for processing only a 
small portion of their milk. The cooperatives who 
would call a milk strike had facilities for process-
ing much of their own milk. 
Objeclive 2 (= maintaining market for members' milk) 
D.A. results indicate that cooperatives that 
rank objective 2 relatively high tend to rank ob-
jective 1 relatively low. This suggests a competi-
tive relationship between these two objectives. 
Objective 6 (= negotiating for value of services provided handlers) 
The D.A. results indicate that cooperatives 
ranking objective 6 high also tend to rank objec-
tive 1 high. It costs a cooperative money to per-
form services for handlers. If it is not adequately 
reimbursed by the handlers, it is losing money 
for its members by performing these services' 
it could increase members' net returns by dis: 
continuing these services. 
Objective 2 
X, (= average volume per handler) 
In R.A. equations not containing X27 (the 
square of X2), the coefficient of X2 was positive. 
In equations containing X271 the coefficient of Xli 
was negative, the coefficient of X21 was positive. 
From R.A. of equation 2.B 
aY, 
d = -" = --0.29 + 0.022 X2 ax. 
Setting d equal to zero 
X2 = 13.2 and 
ad 
-x =0.022 
a 2 
According to these results, the importance of ob-
jective 2 rises as X2 rises to 13.2; as X2 rises 
further, the importance of objective 2 falls. Only 
two of the nine cooperatives studied had values of 
X2 smaller than 13.2. 
It is difficult for me to see why increasing X2 
would first raise, then lower the importance of 
objective 2. It seems more reasonable to believe 
that, at small values of X2, the rank assigned ob-
jective 2 is independent of X2 ; at larger values of 
X2, the rank assigned objective 2 falls with X2 • 
X2 was used in some D.A.; its coefficient was 
negative, but X2 was not a significant discrimi-
nator. 
It may be that, if handlers are large, it is harder 
for them to obtain milk from alternate sources, 
and the cooperative need not concern itself so 
much with maintaining a market. In any case, 
objective 2 was ranked quite high by each co-
operative. 
x. (= percentage of milk used in class I products) 
In D.A. the coefficents of X9 and X26 (the 
square of Xg) were positive. In R.A. the coef-
ficient of X9 was negative if X26 (the square of 
Xg) was included and was positive otherwise. The 
coefficient of X2•1 was negative. From R.A. of 
equation 2.B, 
aY. 
d = -X- = 0.097 - 0.00148 X9 
a II 
Setting d=O 
X g =66 
~=-0.00148 
axu 
According to these results, the importance of ob-
jective 2 falls as X9 rises to 66, then rises as X9 
rises beyond 66. Only three cooperatives had 
values of Xg smaller than 66; for one of these, the 
value of Xu was nearly 66. 
Cooperatives selling large proportions of their 
milk for class I use rank objective 2 relatively 
high. This may be because it hurts more to lose a 
market when much of the milk is used in class I 
products than when most milk is used in class II 
products, since class I price exceeds class II price. 
This would be a situation in which a firm's en-
vironment influences the ranking of its objectives. 
It may also be that vigorous efforts to maintain a 
market tend to lead to high class I usage, but this 
does not seem so likely an explanation as the first 
one since cooperatives usually have little control 
over the proportion of milk going into class I uses. 
The cooperative does not limit the production of 
its members, and the volume of class I sales is 
mainly determined by pricing and merchandising 
activities of bottlers. 
It may be that the importance of objective 2 is 
relatively independent of Xg at sman values of Xg 
but that, for values of X9 above about 66, its im-
portance rises as X9 rises. 
Objective 3 (Maintain Class I Sales) 
x. (= dummy variable) 
I have not found any satisfactory behavioral 
explanation for the D.A. finding of a relation be-
tween X4 and ranking of objective 3. 
x, 
The reason for the finding that high values of 
Xs lead to placing a relatively high rank on objec-
tive 3 is perhaps the same as the explanation for 
the relation between X9 and ranking of objective 
2: When a cooperative has a high class I use, it 
hurts more to lose class I sales than when the co-
operative has a low class I use. The coefficient of 
X9 was negative and nonsignificant in R.A. equa-
tions containing aa (the intercept term). In equa-
tions in which a3 was assumed zero, the coef-
ficient of X9 was positive and significant. This can 
be interpreted as meaning that cooperatives with 
low class I use place more importance on class I 
sales. 
x" ( = number of dairy COWl per crap Icre) 
Coefficients of Xl6 were positive and significant 
in R.A. Its coefficient was negative in D.A., but 
it was not a significant discriminator. 
The relative importance a cooperative places 
on various objectives may be affected by the im-
portance of dairying as a source of members' 
income relative to other enterprises. XlG was in-
cluded as a measure of this importance. Number 
of cows producing grade A milk per crop acre 
would be a better measure. If X1G were really a 
good measure of this importance, one would expect 
a negative coefficient in R.A., meaning that it is 
more important to maintain class I sales if dairy-
ing is an important source of income. 
Objective 4 (Control All Milk In Area) 
According to D.A. and R.A. of equations 4.A 
and 4.C, as X2 rises, objective 4 becomes more im-
portant. This relation may exist because a bot-
tler's incentive and financial ability to obtain milk 
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from cooperative nonmembers nearby rise as the 
bottler becomes larger. To protect itself, the co-
operative must place more importance on inducing 
nonmembers to become members. According to 
R.A. of equation 4.B, objective 4 becomes more 
important as X2 rises to about 21; as X2 rises 
above 21, objective 4 becomes less important. Only 
two cooperatives had values of X2 larger than 21. 
This suggests that, as a bottler's volume rises 
above 21 million pounds per year, he cannot rely 
on nearby nonmembers to supply all the milk he 
needs; and he will have to go a greater distance 
to obtain the needed milk. Then the cooperative's 
need to control aU the milk in its procurement 
area may be less. 
X, (= percentage of cooperative's volume replaceable 
by alternative sources) 
When bottlers can replace a high proportion of 
the cooperative's volume by milk from more dis-
tant sources, the cooperative is less able to protect 
itself by inducing nonmembers to become mem-
bers, and the cooperative may then place less im-
portance on objective 4. This may explain the 
negative coefficient of Xr in D.A., although Xr 
does not differentiate between distant producers 
and nearby nonmember producers. 
If bottlers can obtain most or all the milk they 
need from nearby nonmember producers, this may 
indicate that the cooperative has failed by a wide 
margin to achieve objective 4, and this failure 
has led the cooperative to reduce its aspiration 
level; i.e., to reduce its ranking of objective 4. It 
may be that those bottlers who can obtain milk 
from nearby nonmembers can do so because the 
cooperative has not placed much importance on 
objective 4. 
X, 
R.A. of equation 4.A indicates that objective 
4 becomes less important as Xg rises. R.A. of equa-
tions 4.B and 4.C indicate that objective 4 be-
comes less important as Xo rises to a level of 89 
and 77; as Xo rises above 89 or 77, objective 4 
becomes slightly more important. If class I use is 
between 80 and 100 percent, the benefits obtained 
from cooperative control of all milk may be less 
than if class I use is low. Cost of handling class II 
milk may be lower, and returns from this milk 
higher, if the class II milk is controlled by one 
organization rather than by several (14, 15). 
Other objectives 
Objectives 4 and 5 both represent a desire on 
the part of the cooperative to increase its size. The 
R.A. indicate that cooperatives placing relatively 
high importance on expanding in one of the two 
ways also place relatively high importance on 
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expanding in the other way. R.A. also indicates a 
positive relation between rankings of objectives 
2 and 4. A cooperative will have difficulty increas-
ing the proportion of milk produced in the pro-
curement area that it controls unless it can main-
tain a market for its members' milk. Also, a c0-
operative may have trouble maintaining a market 
for its members' milk unless it controls a large 
proportion of the milk in its procurement area. 
I have found no satisfactory explanation of the 
negative coefficent of Y6j in D.A. 
Objective 5 (Increasing Procurement Area) 
There was little variation in the rankings as-
signed this objective; it was assigned ranks of 6, 
6.5 or 7. The low rank of this objective may be 
related to the high rank assigned to objectives I, 
2 and 3. The attainment of these latter obj ectives 
may be more difficult if the procurement area is 
enlarged. If the cooperative enlarges its procure-
ment area, its class I utilization ratio will fall un-
less it finds additional markets for class I milk. 
X. 
I have not found any satisfactory behavioral 
explanation for the significant negative coeffi-
cient of Xs in R.A. 
Xa 
Increasing the size of a cooperative's procure-
ment area will usually bring more grade A milk 
into a market. This will tend to reduce class I price 
and class I utilization ratio. Both of these are un-
desirable in view of the importance of objectives 
1 and 3. 
Objective 4 
The negative relation between Y4J and Y5j in 
R.A. equation 5.D seems less meaningful than the 
positive relation in equation 4.E. 
Objective 6 (Negotiating Value Of Services 
Provided Bottlers) 
Two managers assigned ranks of 3; all others 
assigned ranks of 5 or 6. 
X, (= percentage of bottlers who bargained) 
The significant positive coefficients of Xl in 
R.A. may be because Xl is effect and Y6 is cause: 
A larger proportion of bottlers may be willing to 
bargain if the cooperative places low importance 
on this objective. This explanation hardly seems 
tenable since most of the cooperatives received 
prices that were more than high enough to re-
imburse them for the services provided to 
handlers (2,5). 
Xl and X2 are positively correlated; X2 is posi-
tively correlated with the rank assi1:,l11ed objective 
6. Small handlers may find it more valuable or 
useful to have the cooperative perform various 
services for them than large handlers do. In this 
cas~, where bottlers are relatively small, it may be 
eaSIer for cooperatives to negotiate for the value 
of their services. This leads to higher expecta-
tions of being able to accomplish this objective 
and, therefore, to placing this objective relatively 
high. 
Obiedives 1 and 4 
The relations between ranks assigned objectives 
1 and 6 and between 4 and 6 have been discussed. 
Objective 7 (Maintaining Good Relations 
With Handlers) 
If a bottler can replace a large proportion of the 
cooperative's milk with milk from other sources 
the cooperative needs good relations with th~ 
handler to protect its market. If the bottler cannot 
e~silr :eplace the cooperative's milk, the coopera-
bve IS III less need of good relations with handlers. 
XII ( = negotiated premium On dass I milk) 
A cooperative placing less importance on main-
tenance of good relations with handlers may be 
more aggressive in bargaining for a class I pre-
mium. In this case, Y1 affects X10, but not vice 
versa. Both high premium and relative unconcern 
with maintenance of good relations may be symp-
toms of aggressive management. In this case Y , 7 
and X IO are determined together. 
X" (= number of bottlers who would bargain) 
The relation between Xu and objective 7 may 
be because of the size of market, with which XII is 
correlated. It is likely that the larger the market 
and the greater the number of bottlers the more 
difficult it is for any bottler to develop an alter-
nate source of milk. Good relations with the co-
operative are more advantageous to a bottler than 
i~ he were in a small market; hence, the coopera-
bve can pay less attention to the quality of re-
lations with bottlers. 
If a cooperative has a large processing plant, 
the need for good relations with handlers may be 
less. It is also possible, though less likely, that a 
manager who does not want to be seriously 
b.othere~ by problems of maintaining good rela-
bo~s WIth handlers will cause a cooperative to 
buIld a large processing plant so there will be less 
need for good relations. 
Objective 1 
The significant positive coefficients of Y1 in 
D.A. of equation 7.L and in two-stage least-
squares equations indicate that managers ranking 
objective 1 high also ranked objective 7 high. Per-
haps the managers more interested in obtaining 
high net returns for members are more aware of 
a need for good relations with handlers because 
handlers are aware of and are unfavorably af-
fected by many of the actions that aggressive 
management will take in its efforts to achieve 
high net returns for members. 
Errors Of Classification 
Three cooperatives were misclassified in table 5. 
These three cooperatives were the second, third 
and fourth largest of the cooperatives studied. 
Size, measured as number of members, was in-
cluded in some functions and did not make a signi-
ficant contribution to the discriminant functions. 
It may be that size is nonlinearly related to rank-
ing objectives or that size above a certain thres-
hold level is related to rankings. 
Two of these three cooperatives also are well 
above average in the percentage of member grade 
A producers in the area served by the cooperative. 
The third cooperative is below average in this 
measure, but this is much the largest and most 
dominant cooperative in a market served by a 
number of cooperatives. We lack data on this but 
I would estimate that the proportion of grade A 
producers serving this market who are cooperative 
members is relatively high. This suggests that 
there may be a nonlinear relation between this 
proportion and the ranking of objectives. 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTsa 
Principa! components may be profitably used in 
the analysIs of rankings of objectives. 
In working with principal components it is fre-
quently convenient to use standardized ~ariables. 
If X it is the t-th observation on the i-th variable, 
Xi is the mean of the i-th variable and 
Sl = [~ (Xit - Xj )2]% 
t 
the standardized variable, is 
Si 
Note that ~ (ZItP = 1 and ~ ZitZjt is the simple 
t t 
correlation between Zi and Zj. 
• rri,!cipnl compon~nts are disCllSSed ill more detail in Anderso (1) 
Glrshlck (2) and Tmtner (12). n • 
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Let Uj denote the j-th principal component of a 
set of standardized variables. Then Ul is that lin-
ear combination of the z's such that the sum of 
squares of the correlation coefficients between 
each Zi and Ul is a maximum. And Uj is that lineal' 
combination of the z's, independent of the first, 
second, ... , (j-1)-st principal components, that 
possesses the property that the sum of the 
squares of the correlation coefficients between 
each Zi and Uj is a maximum. 
Let Z be the column vector of observations on p 
standardized variables z = (Zit, Z2t, ... , Zpt)' and 
let ZZ' = R, the matrix of simple correlations 
among the z's. Then the j-th principal component 
is Ul = a'jZ = ~ ajiZlt. The principal components 
i 
are obtained by solving the characteristic equation 
(R - AI) a = 0 for its characteristic roots A and 
characteristic vectors a. The characteristic roots 
are the roots of the p-th degree polynomial det 
(R - AI) = 0 where det denotes "determinant 
of." If A1 denotes the largest characteristic root, 
al is obtained as the solution for a to the system of 
homogenous equations (R - AJ) a = O. The first 
principal component is P.I = a'l Z. To obtain the 
j-th principal component, the j-th largest char-
acteristic root Aj is obtained, and aj is obtained as 
the solution for a to (R - AjI) a = O. 
Aj is the sum of the squares of the correlation 
coefficients between ILj and the standardized vari-
ables. Dividing the j-th principal component by 
Aj~, we obtain Wj=P.dAj~=~ aJ!Zlt/Aj~; Wj has 
i 
p 
a variance of one. In the equation Zit = ~ Clj 
j = 1 
Wjll Clj is the simple correlation between Zl and Wj. 
S(Clj)2 = 1; i.e., the sum of squares of the correla-
j 
tions between z\ and all Wj is unity. Further, 
~ (Clj)2=Aj; i.e., the sum over all standardized 
i 
variables of the squares of the Cll involving Wj is 
Al' 
The Clj coefficients are the "principal com-
ponents loadings." These loadings may be used to 
combine the Zl into common groups. Each group 
consists of those variables that are highly cor-
related with one component or a small group of 
components. The principal components loadings 
may also be used to identify or interpret each 
component in terms of variables highly correlated 
with it. A component that was highly correlated 
with X7, Xu, Xl2, X13 and Xu could be interpreted 
as a "cooperative size" component since these 
variables are various aspects of cooperative size. 
A component that was highly correlated with Xa, 
Xl and X5 might be interpreted as a "services for 
bottlers" component. 
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A characteristic that makes principal com-
ponents useful in certain circumstances is this: 
It sometimes happens that the last l' (1' < p) 
principal components of p standardized variables 
have small correlations with the original vari-
ables. Then the set of p original variables may be 
replaced by the smaller set of p-r principal 
components with little loss of information. Com-
putation of principal components of the rankings 
of aU ob~ectives might show that a small number 
of prinCipal components "explains" almost all 
variation in rankings of all objectives. Then one 
could re-strict his attention to the analysis of 
variation in these principal components. The 
orthogonality of the principal components makes 
them convenient to use as independent variables 
in regression and discriminant analysis. 
In multiple equation regression analysis and 
discriminant analysis models, one might use 
principal components of rankings of all but the 
k-th objective as explanatory variables in equa-
tions for the k-th objective. 
Statistical analysis of objectives is in the ex-
ploratory stage. In exploratory work, it may be 
convenient to use principal components as in~ 
dependent variables rather than use the original 
variables as independent. See Massy (7) for a 
discussion of use of principal components in ex-
ploratory research. 
From the set of X's defined in the Regression 
Analysis of Rankings section, the nine variables 
Xl, X2, Xo, Xs, Xo, X10, Xu, X1S and XIS were 
selected on statistical grounds. The variables were 
standardized, and their principal components 
were computed. The nine characteristic roots are 
presented in table 7. The value of the j-th char-
acteristic root equals the sum of the squares of 
the correlations between the j~th principal com-
ponent and the nine standardized variables Zl 
(i = 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16). The Cll are 
shown in table 8. The first four principal com-
ponents "explained" from 85 to 99 percent of the 
variance of each standardized variable. That is , 
0.85 ,,;;; ~ (Clj)2 <; 0.99. 
j =1 
Table 7. Characteristic roots of matrix of correlations between X" X" 
X" x., X., X,., XII, XII, and X". 
j·th characteristic root - ,\j 
1.............. .......................................................................... 4.3316 
2 ........................................................................................ 2.4772 
3 ........................................................................................ 0.9386 
4 ........................................................................................ 0.8242 
5 ........................................................................................ 0.3273 
6 ........................................................................................ 0.0736 
7 ........................................................................................ 0.0260 
8 ........................................................................................ 0.0013 
9 ........................................................................................ 0.0001 
Table 8. C matrix for principal components of Independent variables." 
Component j, Wj 
Variable i 
z, 2 3 4 5 6 
1 .................... 0.12 -0.98 0.07 0.Q1 0.06 -0.05 
2 .................... -0.04 -O.Bl -0.56 -0.05 0.12 0.09 
6 .................... -0.B9 -0.05 -0.12 -0.42 -0.05 0.05 
B .................... -0.B4 -0.12 -0.05 -0.50 -0.05 -0.14 
9 .................... 0.31 -0.56 0.70 -0.27 -0.11 O.OB 
10 .................... -0.92 -0.001 0.15 0.35 -0.03 -0.09 
11 .................... -O.BO -0.30 0.27 0.24 0.37 0.002 
13 .................... -0.83 0.51 0.10 -0.07 O.OB 0.15 
16 .................... -0.73 -0.42 -0.07 0.36 -0.38 0.05 
• Cit is the simple correlation between ZI and WI- All ell (j = 7. 8. 
9) ut one were less than 0.06 i'n absolute value; ClT = 0.11. 
These nine variables might be classified into 
three groups: (a) variables 6, 8, 10, 11, 13 and 16, 
all highly correlated with factor 1; (b) variables 
1 and 2, which are highly ·correlated with com-
ponent 2 and (c) variable 9, which is highly cor-
related with component 3. In this study it does 
not seem possible to identify or interpret the 
various components since each component is cor-
related with diverse types of variables. 
Although the first four components "explained" 
most of the variance of the standardized vari-
ables, some of the last five principal components 
were significantly correlated with the rankings. 
In the following regressions of rankings upon 
principal components of the X's, Y1j is the rank 
assigned objective i by manager of cooperative j, 
and Wij is the value of the i-th principal com-
ponent of the standardized variables for co-
operative j. Y1j and YSj were not highly correlated 
with any of the principal components. 
(2.N) Y2j = -0.940 WSj 1'2 = 0.884*** 
(0.120)*** 
(3.N) Y~j = -0.406 Wtj - 0.373 Waj 
(0.133) ** <0.133) ** 
- 0.714 WS! + 0.313 Wah 
(0.133)*** <0.133)* 
R2 = 0.911 >1<** 
(4.N) Y4J = 0.646 Wal 1'2 = 0.418** 
(0.270) ** 
(6.N) Y6! = 0.609 WI! - 0.544 W2! 
(0.086) *** (0.086) *** 
- 0.089 wa! + 0.537 W6 h 
(0.086) <0.086) *** 
R2 = 0.963*** 
(7.N) Y7j = -0.890 WI! + 0.292 w2! 
(0.052) *** (0.052) *M 
+ 0.139 Wal + 0.128 W S! - 0.276 WSh 
(0.052) >I< (0.052) >I< (0.052) *** 
R2 = 0.989*** 
The third principal component, W 3 h appears in 
each of these equations; w fij appears in three of 
them. Although Ws and Ws are not highly cor-
related with variables significant in R.A. or D.A., 
their coefficients are significant in several of 
equations 2.N to 7.N. The first principal com-
ponent, W 1 j, also appears in three of these equa-
tions. WI is highly correlated with Xa, Xs and Xl3 
-variables significant in R.A. or D.A. of objQctive 
1; but W l is not highly correlated with YI • On the 
other hand, "'1 is highly correlated with XIO , Xu 
and XI3 - variables significant in R.A. or D.A. 
of objective 7; and WI is highly c01'l'elated with 
Yr. Further, WI is not especially highly cOl'Telated 
with X9 or Xlr. or Xl - variables significant in 
R.A. or D.A. of objectives 3 and 6; but the coef-
ficients of W t in equations 3.N and 6.N are signi-
ficant. W 2 is highly correlated with Xl; the coef-
ficient of Xl was significant in R.A. of objective 
6 and the coefficient of W z is highly significant in 
equation 6.N. On the other hand, W 2 is not highly 
correlated with X10, Xu or X13 - variables whose 
coefficients were significant in R.A. or D.A. of 
objective 7. In equation 7.N, however, the coef-
ficient of w ~ is highly significant. Hence,. the 
results of using principal components of the X's 
could not have been predicted on the basis of a 
knowledge of the results of regressions using the 
X's and a knowledge of the correlations in table 8. 
Rankings Y 1), Y 2), • • • , Y 7j were standardized; 
and their principal components were computed. 
:r'he characteristic roots are shown in table 9. Aj 
IS the sum of the squares of the correlations be-
tween the seven standardized variables and the 
j-th principal component. The first four principal 
components "explained" between 92 and 99 per-
cent of the variance of the rankings of each ob-
jective, except objective 5, and "explained" 88 
percent of the variance of the rankings assigned 
this objective. The first five principal components 
"explained" 99 percent of the variance of the 
rankings of objective 5. Hence, if one could statis-
tically explain most of the variance of the first 
four components, he would have explained most of 
the variance of the rankings of the seven objec-
tives. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
Perhaps the single most important requirement 
in studies of this type is that considerable care be 
taken to develop an exhaustive list of relevant ob-
jectives in terms meaningful to the researcher 
and to the managers. It is also necessary to 
Table 9. Characteristic roots of the matrix of correlations between 
VI, Y." .... , v7• 
j.th characteristic root -:- ,\ j 
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explain the objectives carefully so that managers 
will understand the objectives and so that their 
rankings will be meaningful. 
Some variables treated as exogenous in the 
multiple-equation regression model in this study 
may be endogenous. Some results suggested that 
the cooperative's size may be nonlinearly related 
to the ranks assigned to some of the objectives. 
X16 is not a good measure of the importance of 
dairying as a source of income to members. Data 
on physical and economic characteristics of the 
cooperative and its market, such as were used 
here, could be supplemented with data on psycho-
logical or sociological traits of managers or boards 
of directors. 
There are a number of unsettled questions con-
cerning choice of the appropriate statistical 
methods for analyzing variations in rankings. 
Many of these questions of statistical method 
have already been mentioned. One merits further 
discussion. The variables, Ykih used in the dis-
criminant analyses are, in effect, arbitrary de-
pendent variables in regression. The variables, 
Ykh used in the regression analyses as dependent 
variables are also arbitrary dependent variables. 
Any monotonic transformation of Ykj would serve 
as well as YkJ to show the order of importance of 
the seven objectives to cooperative j. In table 1, 
for example, 3, 1, 2, 4,7,6 and 5 are used to show 
the order of importance of objectives 1,2, ... ,7 
to cooperative two. However, 7.2,0.6, 1.8,7.35,66, 
16.8 and 9.1476 could have been used. These seven 
numbers preserve the order of the numbers 
actually used. This difficulty arises because ordi-
nal (ordering) numbers are used for ranking. On a 
slightly different interpretation of Ykj , however, 
(if there are no ties), a simple transformation of 
Ykj is a counting (cardinal) number. If there are 
no ties in the ranks assigned by cooperative j, Ykl 
- 1 is the number of objectives that are of more 
importance to cooperative j than objective k is. If 
there are ties, let T = the number of objectives 
of the same importance as objective k. Then 
Y1<j - 1 - T /2 = Nki is the number of objectives 
of greater importance than objective k to coopera-
tive j. Nkj is a straightforward counting variable 
and could be used as a dependent variable in re-
gression analyses. A few such regressions were 
run; the results were not greatly different from 
the results obtained by using Ykl as dependent. 
There is a fundamental question whether co-
operative managers (or economic agents in 
general) do know and can verbalize (or can recog-
nize another person's verbalization of) their 
objectives. The number of statistically significant 
and economically meaningful results obtained in 
this study strongly indicates that the managers 
did know several of the more important objectives 
of their organization. We do not know, however, 
that the list of objectives used here was exhaus-
tive. We do not know how a cooperative manager's 
views of the objectives of the organization may 
differ from the views of the board of directors 
or the members, nor how any differences affect 
the behavior of the cooperative. 
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